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NEVADA LAWYER
The Status of the Notice/
Prejudice Rule for Liability
Insurance Claims in Nevada
BY TIMOTHY S. MENTER, ESQ., AND PROFESSOR JEFFREY W. STEMPEL
nsurers in Nevada often argue that timely notice is a necessary pre-condition to coverage and that they
need not suffer prejudice in order to invoke a "late notice defense." Property insurance and general liability
insurance policies usually stat  that notice of claims or suits be "prompt," made "as s on s pr cticable," or
"immediate." Liability insurance policies, however, normally do not set forth specific deadlines. Nonetheless,
insurers in Nevada regularly argue that late notice bars coverage, even when the policy lacks a specified time
limit for providing notice and even when there is no harm to the insurer due to late notification.
Initially, in order to enforce a notice condition in an
insurance policy, it should be raised as a reason for denial.
See Nevada Administrative Code ("NAC") 686A.675(I).
Insurers must carefully and specifically state late notice
as a reason for denial of coverage or risk waiver of this
defense. See, e.g., Mapes Casino, Inc. v. Maryland Cas.
Co., 290 F Supp. 186, 191-192 (D. Nev. 1968) (failure to
include late notice as reason for denial results in waiver
of this coverage requirement). Likewise, policyholders
should thoroughly review all coverage position letters
issued by insurers to determine the grounds that the
insurer is relying upon.
Insurers typically argue that Nevada law applies a
strict late notice defense with "no prejudice required"
to bar coverage on the basis of a 57-year-old Nevada
Supreme Court decision, State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Cassinelli, 67 Nev. 227, 216 P.2d 606 (1950), that
has now become outdated. Even when Cassinelli was
authored, the traditional, strict late notice defense
was under attack. In the half-century since Cassinelli,
almost all states have adopted the view that late notice
defeats insurance coverage only when the insurer is
significantly prejudiced by the late notice in terms
of its ability to investigate a loss or defend a claim.'
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Further, the clear majority of states require that the
insurer bear the burden to establish prejudice from
late notice, with a handful of states requiring the
policyholder to prove lack of prejudice. 2
New York and a few other states can be said to have
rendered "modern" or "recent" decisions continuing
to maintain the historical view that since timely notice
is a condition precedent to coverage, any breach of the
notice condition makes coverage unavailable, even if
the late notice works no impairment to the insurer.3
Neighboring California has a longstanding "notice-
prejudice" rule for insurance claims that has been
deemed by the U.S. Supreme Court to be part of the
core-content of the state's insurance law.' In this area,
of course, insurance policyholders would prefer that
Nevada expressly follow California's longstanding
approach, as this will make coverage more available
in situations where a policyholder or its agent may
have delayed too long before providing notice to
an applicable insurer. Insurers, by contrast, prefer
the old rule that no prejudice be shown to sustain
a late notice defense as this will enable insurers to
avoid coverage more frequently. The modern "notice-
prejudice" or "prejudice-required" rule is widely
preferred by courts and insurance scholars for sound
reasons of public policy. Requiring the insurer to
demonstrate prejudice in order to avoid coverage that
was otherwise purchased by the policyholder (who
may have paid premiums for years as part of a risk
management program) avoids unnecessary forfeiture
of contractual rights. Utilizing a notice-prejudice rule
protects the legitimate interests of the policyholder and
society with no unfairness to the insurer, who remains
free to raise any other applicable defenses to coverage,
such as the applicability of a specific exclusion related
to the loss or claim.
Nonetheless, insurers have had some success in
Nevada, arguing that Cassinelli continues to be valid
authority and controls the notice question irrespective
of the compelling arguments in favor of the modern
majority rule. But any successful invocation of
Cassinelli is undeserved. The case should no longer
be considered good law in Nevada. Cassinelli has been
completely undermined by subsequent developments
in both case law and insurance regulation. Changes
to Nevada law regulating insurers have effectively
overruled Cassinelli and implicitly placed Nevada
in accord with the majority of jurisdictions that
have adopted the modern "notice-prejudice" rule.
Denials based upon late notice are invalid unless
the insurer can demonstrate either a violation of a
specific timeframe notice condition that is reasonable
in length or that it was prejudiced as a result of the
delay in notification.
The Cassinelli court's conclusion that prejudice was
immaterial was based upon what it then determined
to be the "overwhelming weight of authority." In
reaching this conclusion, Cassinelli relied upon
decisions of the high courts of Vermont, Tennessee,
South Carolina, Kentucky, Rhode Island and Maryland,
an Illinois intermediate court and an Eighth Circuit
decision interpreting Missouri law.5 Today, the law
of all these states except arguably Illinois recognizes
that prejudice is required in order for an insurer
to invoke a late notice defense to coverage.6 The
landscape of the law throughout the United States
has changed dramatically since 1950 regarding the
"notice-prejudice" issue. Today, most states that
have considered late notice as a defense to coverage
have held that prejudice is a prerequisite for denying
coverage under a liability policy.'
Courts applying the modern notice-prejudice rule
frequently cite the public policy considerations favoring
the rule, such as the nature of insurance policies as
contracts of adhesion, the reasonable expectations of the
policyholder, the general preference of contract law to
avoid unnecessary forfeitures: protection of third party
interests, and societal interests regarding availability
of insurance. See, e.g., UNUM Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 526
U.S. 358, 366 (1999) (noting this rationale in California
precedents under review); Alcazar v. Hayes, 982 S.W2d
845, 850-53 (Tenn. 1998); Jones v. Bituminous Casualty
Corp., 821 S.W2d 798, 801 (Ky. 1991); Indiana Ins. Co.
v. Williams, 463 N.E.2d 257, 265 (Ind. 1984); Weaver
Bros. v. Chappel, 684 P.2d 123, 125 (Alaska 1984); Lusch
v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 Or. 593, 600, 538 P2d
902, 905 (1975); Cooper v. GEICO, 51 N.J. 86, 93, 237
A.2d 870, 873 (1968); Fox v. National Say. Ins. Co., 424
P.2d 19, 25 (Okla. 1967). All of these are sound public
policy rationales for the modern rule.'
It therefore appears likely, if not certain, that if the
same Nevada Supreme Court addressed the facts of
Cassinellitoday, it would come to the opposite conclusion
based on the national shift in favor of a notice-prejudice
rule and find that prejudice on the part of the insurer
is material and necessary for enforcement of a notice
condition.
Defenders of the historical "no prejudice required"
version of a late notice defense can, however, point
to certain post-Cassinelli case law as arguably being
supportive of this approach. See, e.g., S.B. Corporation
v. Hartford Acc. and Indem. Co., 880 F. Supp. 751 (D. Nev.
1995); Las Vegas Star Taxi, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Inc. Co., 102 Nev. 11, 714 P2d 562 (1986). However, on
closer examination, these cases appear to rest on a shaky
foundation, in that neither case considered modern case
law on late notice or subsequent Nevada Administrative
Code changes discussed below. Moreover, Star Taxi





involved notice given to the insurer only 10 days prior
to trial and a settlement entered into by the policyholder
without the insurer's consent a mere seven days later
on the cusp of trial. In this sort of situation, an insurer
would presumably be able to establish prejudice from
the late notice. The Star Taxi insurer likely did not
need the benefit of the now-outdated "no prejudice
required" rule. The court, in fact, stated that it was
not necessary to consider prejudice, as it would have
found prejudice as a matter of law.
SB Corporation applied a "no prejudice required" rule
without analysis of either the current state of the law,
the authority underlying Cassinelli, or the public policy
implications of continuing to cleave to the traditional
approach of allowing insurers to avoid coverage even
in the absence of prejudice. Neither Star Taxi nor S.B.
Corporationexamined Nevada administrative regulations
governing insurance. Further, the court in Star Taxi did
not even mention Cassinelli, again confirming that the
facts of Star Taxi were more important to the outcome
than prior precedent.
In addition to the implicit overruling of Cassinelli
because of changes in the assumptions and facts
upon which Cassinelli was decided, administrative
developments in Nevada law now establish that an
insurer show prejudice in order to enforce a notice
provision of a policy. Since the Nevada Supreme Court
decided Cassinelli, Nevada insurance regulations that
effectively overrule the decision have been promulgated.
NAC 686A.660 states in part (emphasis added):
No insurer may, except where there is a time
limit specified in the insurance contract or
policy, require a claimant to give written
notice of loss or proof of loss within a specified
time or seek to relieve the insurer of the
obligations if the requirement is not complied
with, unless the failure to comply prejudices
the insurer's rights.
NAC 686A.600 specifies that NAC 686A.660 applies
to all insurance contracts. Therefore, by law, Nevada
requires an insurer to show prejudice in order to
enforce a general, non-time specific, notice provision.
Further, the term "claimant" is defined as including
both first-party and third-party claimants. See NAC
686A.620.9
Administrative regulations such as NAC 686.660
have the force of law. See State v. Safeway Super
Service Stations, Inc., 99 Nev. 626, 630, 668 P.2d 291,
294 (1983). Additionally, these regulations are binding
until repealed by the agency or declared invalid by
a court. See Bing Construction Company of Nevada
v. Nevada Dept. of Taxation, 109 Nev. 275, 279, 849
P.2d 302, 305 (1993). The notice regulations cited
above have existed for 20 years without repeal or even
judicial criticism.
Accordingly, insurers should take into account
the Nevada insurance regulations and issues, such as
prejudice, when evaluating whether or not to assert
or otherwise rely upon a general liability policy notice
provision. This is in line with the large majority of
jurisdictions that have considered this issue and is also
in line with sound public policy. C
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1 See BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES § 4.02(c)[2] (13th ed. 2006); EMERIC FISCHER, PETER
NASH SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW §
9.01 (3d ed. 2004 & Supp. 2006); JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, STEMPEL ON
INSURANCE CONTRACTS § 9.01 (3d ed. 2006 & Supp. 2007); EUGENE
R. ANDERSON, JORDAN S. STANZLER & LORELIE S. MASTERS, INSURANCE
COVERAGE LITIGATION § 5.02[A] (2d ed. 2000 & Supp. 2006). See,
e.g., West Bay Exploration Co. v. AIG Specialty Agencies, Inc., 915
F2d 1030, 1036 (6th Cir 1990) (applying Michigan law); Friedland
v. Travelers Inden. Co., 105 P3d 639, 643 (Colo. 2005); Alcazar v
Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845, 850-53 (Tenn. 1998); Harwell v. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 896 S.W.2d 170, 174 (Tex. 1995); Molyneaux v.
Molyneaux, 533 A.2d 49 (N.J. 1989); Pennsylvania Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Becton, 475 A.2d 1032 (R.I. 1984); Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Bowes,
381 Mass. 278, 409 N.E.2d 185 (1980).
2 See Ostrager & Newman, supra note 1, § 4.02(c) [4]; Fischer, Swisher
& Stempel, supra note 1, at 520 (noting that Colorado, Florida, Ohio,
Indiana, and Iowa create a rebuttable presumption of prejudice
from late notice that may be overcome by the policyholder's
demonstration of lack of prejudice to the insurer). The burden of
establishing prejudice should logically be placed on the insurer
since the insurer is in the best position to show the existence of
prejudice. The insurer has a near monopoly on information regarding
the actual difficulties, if any, that may have been caused by late notice
as respects the investigation, adjustment, or defense of a claim. See
Stempel on Insurance Contracts, supra note 1, at § 9.01, p. 9-35 ("the
better approach is to assign the persuasion burden to the insurer.");
see, e.g., Prince George's County v. Local Gov't Ins. Trust, 879 A.2d
81 (Md. 2005) (insurer has burden of showing prejudice).
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3 See Fischer, Swisher & Stempel, supra note 1, at 519-20 (listing
Alabama, Connecticut, New York, and Virginia as states still following
the traditional "no prejudice required" rule for a late notice defense.
See, e.g. Sec. Mut. Ins. Co. v Acker- Fitzsimmons Corp., 31 N.Y
2d 436, 293 N.E.2d 76, 340 N.YS. 2d 902 (1972). New York does
not apply the traditional rule to reinsurance and instead requires
reinsurers to demonstrate prejudice from late notice to avoid
coverage. See Unigard Sec. Ins. co. v North River Ins. Co., 79 N.Y2d
576, 584 N.YS.2d 290, 594 N.E.2d 571 (1992). However, excess
insurers continue to enjoy the protection of the traditional rule. See
American Homes Assur Co. v. International Ins. Co., 90 N.Y2d 433,
661 N.YS.584, 685 N.E.2d 14 (1997). Illinois takes an unusual hybrid
approach requiring that notice to the insurer be "reasonable" while
considering prejudice to the insurer and timeliness as factors in
determining whether notice is reasonable. See Country Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Livorsi Marine, Inc., 222 III. 2d 303, 311-12, 316, 856 N.E.2d 338,
342, 345, 305 III. Dec. 533 (111. 2006).
4 See UNUM Life Ins. Co. v Ward, 526 U.S. 358 (1999) (reviewing origin,
force, and rational of California's notice-prejudice rule and deeming
it part of state insurance regulation not preempted by ERISA).
5 Jefferson Really Co. v. Employers Liability Assur Corp. 149 SW. 1011
(Ky. App. 1912); Phoenix Cotton Oil Co. v: Royal Indem. Co., 205 S.W.
128 (Tenn. 1918); Lee v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 186 S.E. 376 (S.C.
1936); Sherwood Ice. Co. v. United States Cas. Co., 100 A. 572 (R.I.
1917); Employers Liability Assur. Corp. v. Perkins, 181 A. 436 (Md.
1935); St. Louis Architectural Iron Co. v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co, 40
F2d 344 (8th Cir. 1930) (Missouri law); Meyer v. Iowa Mutual Liability
Ins. Co., 240 III. App. 431 (1926).
6 Jones v: Bituminous Cas. Co., 821 S.W.2d 798 (Ky. 1991) (insurer
must prove prejudice); Alcazarv Hayes, 982 S.W.2d 845 (Tenn. 1998)
(notice immaterial when insurer not prejudiced); Factory Mut. Liab.
Ins. Co. of Am. v. Kennedy, 182 S.E.2d 727 (S.C. 1971) (insurer must
show substantial prejudice to enforce notice provision in liability
policy); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584
(R.I. 1971) (insurer must show prejudice); Prince George's County
v Local Gov't Ins. Trust, 879 A.2d 81 (Md. 2005) (insurer must show
prejudice); Hawkeye Security Ins. Co. v. Davis, 277 F2d 765 (8th Cir.
1960) (citing change in Missouri law and that insurer must show
prejudice). As noted above, Illinois considers prejudice to the insurer
but does not make it a requirement for a successful late notice
defense to coverage. See Country Mut. Ins. Co. v Livorsi Marine, Inc.,
856 N.E.2d 338, 345 (111. 2006) (discussed in note 5, supra).
7 See, e.g., Prince George's County v. Local Gov't Ins. Trust, 879 A.2d
81, 93-94 fn. 9 (Md. 2005) (survey of case law concluded that 38
states and 2 territories had adopted a prejudice requirement and
stating that the so-called majority rule cited in Cassinelli was now the
minority rule).
8 Nevada law is consistent in its recognition that insurance policies are
contracts of adhesion. See Farmers Ins. Group v. Stonik, 110 Nev.
64, 67, 867 P2d 389, 391 (1994).
9 "First-party claimant" is defined as a person or any other legal
entity asserting a right to payment under an insurance contract.
See NAC 686A.625.
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